He explained roll control by snapping the stick left and right, causing my helmet to nearly strike the canopy. Then, to define pitch control, he sharply shoved the stick forward to about minus 1G, and hauled it back to about plus 2Gs. At about that point, straight ahead, a towering cumulus cell loomed up. We could have banked steeply right or left to avoid it but Morris chose a different path.

Cruising along peacefully at 28,000 feet, and maybe 200 miles north of Los Angeles, I got a call on the interphone from the purser. She told me that some of the passengers on the right side of the first-class cabin were saying out loud that they thought the right engine was not running.

During the ILS approach, the glide slope failed. The DC-10 ahead of us made a missed approach. I advised the first officer to change the decision altitude of 852 feet to the minimum descent altitude of 1,140 feet and that we would continue the approach to localizer approach minimums. I also stated that I started the timer at the outer marker.

I'm free in the Skylane and I'm not in the 707. That's why so many airline pilots are private pilots too and own airplanes. It's too bad more people don't realize that about 99% of the airline pilots are very much on the private pilot's side of things and often envy him considerably. They don't feel he's their problem in life.

There is an impressive surge of AOA rhetoric—“lifesaving,” “correct,” “optimum”—but such language can be misleading. “Correct” and “optimum” may fit the context of the speaker but not necessarily apply to the situations of the listener, who may be considering other flight operations, or having to deal with real world scenarios. While the decision on where to expend safety resources will vary from pilot to pilot, the NTSB reports of this study do not support visual AOA indicators for impossible turns as a silver bullet to address overall safety issues.

A personal telephone call from the Captain of a Holland America ship signified the importance of assistance urgently needed. A couple of passengers onboard had received a call that their daughter had been kidnapped back home in the US. They needed to catch a commercial flight from Nassau back home as soon as possible.

Earlier this year I argued that if IFR pilots wanted to prevent accidents, they should focus on the most boring of skills: basic attitude instrument flying. Now it’s time to look at VFR pilots, and to spare you the suspense, the answer is similarly prosaic: loss of control on landing damages more airplanes than any other accident scenario. What can be done?