The NASA ASRS system was created about 34 years ago, with the main purpose of identifying hazards to the overall approach to safety. In doing so, there had to be some caveats which insured its success. Perhaps the greatest one being that whatever information was disseminated through this process could not (BY LAW) be used in any type of enforcement against the reporting source.
Let us not forget that the circling approach maneuver is designed as a last resort, non-precision approach. A circling approach is one that, by dwindling numbers and its inherent design, forces the pilot(s) into a seldom used and high-risk evolution–often migrating us to an unexpected and seldom visited zip code of the threat/error management neighborhood.
what was causing our 400,000 lbs. abode to creep forward at an alarmingly increasing rate? What was earlier yards or even feet of separation now seemed like mere inches. Those vehicles, those people, they had no way to move, no way to extricate themselves from the approaching doom.
After what seemed like centuries of silence, I looked to my right and noticed it was quickly getting brighter – much brighter – when all of a sudden, over the hump in the runway appeared a very large aircraft whose bright landing lights were mimicking noon. It was growing in size, accelerating by the second.
One crewmember prefers to terminate the flight in the interest of safety, adherence to existing rules, and compliance with standard operating procedures. The other crewmember – through body language, grunts, hand signals, and time-consuming silent deferrals – intends to “press on and get the mission done”. It becomes obvious that a covert difference of opinion permeates the cockpit infusing in its wake the unmistakable aroma of deference.