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Is GA Getting Safer?
The AOPA Air Safety Institute (ASI) recently released its 35th annual accident report covering the years from 2008 to 2023 (remember, it takes approximately two years for the NTSB to issue a probable cause statement for any given accident). And the good news is that GA has never been safer. However, even though most of the press coverage has been mainly focused on the report’s positive high-level trends, the devil is as they say, in the details.
There Be Dragons
As the report even admits, the overall lower numbers were mainly due to an increase in flight hours: there were 1.6 million more hours flown in 2023 than in 2022. But despite the total accident rate trending downward from 1152 to 1097, the total number of fatal accidents slightly rose from 181 to 186. For non-commercial fixed-wing GA (the focus of this article), this trend continued with total accidents ticking down slightly while fatal accidents basically remaining the same. And it is in the fatality rate that I believe provides a better overall industry-wide safety metric than just the total accident one. So, with that in mind, let’s take a deeper dive behind these numbers, with an emphasis on the fatality rate, to underscore what most of you already tangentially know but what the numbers also pan out.
Disco Fright
One of the most disturbing increases was in the number of accidents during instruction. In 2022, only 16.1% of all accidents were attributed to instruction operations, while in 2023 that jumped up significantly to 20.3%. Moreover, the number of fatalities also went up from 16 to 24 respectively. Could 2023 just be an outlier or more indicative of a new norm? For reference, a decade ago, that number hovered around 15% or less. And now looking forward at the preliminary 2024 numbers, instruction accounts for almost 20% of all accidents. One interesting corollary is that the number of active CFIs also jumped up significantly in 2023 over previous years. Perhaps the sharp influx of inexperienced instructors is driving some of these numbers higher? Don’t know. But this definitely needs to be an area of concern for ASI going forward.
An Instrument Rating Won’t Save You
We all know that most accidents, and thus fatalities, happen in Day VMC simply due to density. However, what is far more telling is the survivability rate given the flight conditions: In 2023, Day VMC, out of the 806 total accidents, only 105 were fatal. Compare that to Day IMC, where out of the 20 total accidents, 19 were fatal. Counterintuitively, Night IMC faired slightly better with “only” 11 out of the 13 total accidents resulting in fatalities. It should come to you as no surprise then that VFR info IMC was by far the deadliest combo. However, what is surprising is that approximately 50% of all fatal accidents had at least one IR pilot onboard!
These numbers clearly speak to the difference between proficiency vs. currency and just how unforgiving flying in IMC can be, intentionally or not. Put simply, having the rating is one thing, knowing how to use it is quite another.
And Neither Will Another Engine
A lot of pilots believe that having a second engine is safer than having only one. Maybe. But light twins still present a whole slew of challenges that are clearly evident from their fatality rates. Even though in 2023, multiengine ops accounted for just 77 accidents, 21 of them were fatal for a lethality of 27.3%, over twice as deadly compared to single-engine fixed gear, where only 92 out of 683 accidents were fatal for a lethality of just 13.5%. One obvious takeaway is that the margin for error in light twins is just much lower than in singles. Proficiency is not an option. So, although having a second engine certainly makes sense if you often fly over treacherous terrain or water, it is not without real operational consequences too.
Stupid Pilot Tricks
The biggest killer by far is still poor ADM. Approximately 68% of all fatal accidents were pilot induced. And despite ticking down slightly from 2022, this rate has remained that way since the report’s inception, with only a significant bump in 2020 before settling back down again. And it isn’t clear to me how ASI distinguishes between an accident caused more so by questionable preflight planning than a pilot stumbling into a CB or ice. If you have ever read an NTSB report, then you know of what I speak.
One silver lining though is that experience does matter – ATP/CPL rates are lower across the board than their PPL counterparts. Of course, this assumes higher ratings equate to more total time which isn’t always the case. I do think some room for improvement in this report is a breakdown of accidents by total time. Regardless, no matter how I cherry-pick the numbers or what ratings I have, I am still the biggest liability statistically speaking when I jump in the cockpit. Go me.
GA Is Still Safer, Right?
Definitely. On the other hand, I’m not sure how much there is to be gained by touting that fact incessantly though. I certainly don’t ever recall citing this report as an excuse to turn the key to the “Both” position. Rather, it behooves all of us as pilots to understand where GA still falls short, particularly within the context of our own performance, so we can all find new ways to collectively mitigate them. The fact is for the last decade, we still really haven’t lowered the pilot related accident rate despite advancements in training, avionics, and now online scrutiny speaks volumes to me. At the very minimum, the numbers cited above should carry some preflight weight when making the go vs. no-go decision. Because if there is one thing I know for certain is that none of us want to end up in the next edition of this report.
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These surveys, while interesting overlook one simple fact-The overwhelming number of pilots are not professionals who fly every day. To be truly proficient is simply not realistic. Airlines fly state of the art equipment with sophisticated maintenance protocols, versus someone flying a 40 year old Cessna that gets inspected once a year. There is an outcry when one airliner crashes maybe once a year yet in GA “accidents” are routine. Flying has always been risky, the best way to truly drop the figures in this report would be to simply stay on the ground
Keep in mind, that last sentence applies to commercial ops as well – yet flying is by far the safest way to travel. It wasn’t always though. I also think leveraging this report as a way to do some communal self-reflection can’t hurt.
Although the data presented provides grounds for discussion and perhaps focus in flight training, there just isn’t enough relevant information in the McSpadden report to draw some of the conclusions in this article. For example, Alexander Sack says that the data shows pilots with ATP ratings to be safe than other (which I want my insurance company to believe). The information on AOPA’s website, however, shows that the pilot category with the lowest of total accidents is are sport pilot! Why is that? (Plenty of guesses, but where is the data?) Relative safety of twins vs singles is another point of confusion. Yes, AMEL accidents are more likely to be fatal than ASEL accidents, but…and you have to go into the FAA, rather than the AOPA reports for this…ASEL aircraft are, hour for hour, much more likely to be involved in accidents than AMEL. Of course, ASEL are used in primary instruction while AMEL pilots usually have more experience and higher ratings, but there just isn’t enough data in the McSpadden report to draw any definitive conclusions about that. So, given a non-instructional flight with a Commercial or ATP rated pilot on board, which is safer, ASEL of AMEL? I don’t think that the data is there to make that kind of determination. I would be happy if I could be pointed to the data that shows me where I am wrong about that. (But if it turns out that AMELs flown by ATPs are more likely to be in accidents, please don’t tell my insurance company.)
You bring up a few points, so let’s unpack them (not necessarily in order):
– I am talking about non-commercial fixed-wing in this article. Sure, if we account for Part 121 and 135, which I suspect are overwhelming multi-engine ops, then the statistics would clearly skew back the other way. But in GA land, light twins are statistically more fatal than singles year over year (this really is not shocking given the lower margin for error in a twin and the wide range of experience a potential GA twin pilot may have vs. a commercial op which have minimums (OPSPEC), multi-member crews, and orders of magnitude more advanced aircraft).
– Insurance, which I am acutely aware of right now (article forthcoming), care far more about time in type than ratings post your instrument, e.g., a CFI rating would not reduce my rate a single penny according to at least three underwriters I spoke to. Let me flip your other question on you: Are you safe with a 1500 hour ATP with 0 time in type or an IR pilot with 500 in it? You could make a good case for either. Regardless, I DO KNOW which one is going to pay a higher premium though for that type.
– I think with MOSIAC, your wish for more sport pilots statistics will soon be granted (for better or worse). I do think you have to look at the rate per hours flown AND have a minimum of total hours for the statistic to carry any signal. I agree with you though, the data is just not there (and if I recall, the number of sport pilots is very small compared to the greater pilot population writ large).
1. No, I was very careful to examine ONLY GA/non-commercial fixed wing. This was not as easy as it seems because the FAA combines GA and Part 135. This requires even more work to separate out non-commercial GA from air taxi and fractional ownership Part 91. You can’t get that data from the AOPA report.
2. My hypothesis is that private GA ASEL pilots are more likely to get into accidents than MEL pilots with Comm/ATP, based on accidents per hours flown drawn from the FAA database. I suggest that Comm and ATPs are less likely to get into the lower end of the more frequent kinds of accidents and incidents that private pilots get into. (Nit picking point — here in the USA, there are no PPLs, there are no Private Pilot LICENSES. They are certificates. There is a difference.) But, the kinds of accidents MEL pilots get involved in are more likely to be fatal. I hypothesize that those kinds of accidents are equally fatal to ASEL pilots. You can say that what kills AMEL pilots is having to deal with an engine failure in various modes of flight. You would be absolutely correct. Just like engine failure in a single engine plane, especially at night or in IMC. But, we need more data to make that a workable hypothesis and not just speculation. (BTW turbine SEL have a higher accident rate than piston MEL. That kind of throws a wrench into both the ASEL vs AMEL and the private vs Comm/ATP hypotheses.)
3. I do not believe that Sport plots are safer than any other category. I just point that out as a caution about what the raw numbers do NOT tell us.
4. I will be interested in what you find out about insurance. My broker said that they do consider ATP as a discriminator, but time in type and recency is even more important, along with recurrent training. I was told that they don’t care about FAA Wings, what they want to know about is the training that you did to get the Wings. For older pilots, the broker said that they do look at medical class, preferring annual certification.
How likely are you to find a 1500 hour ATP acting as PIC with 0 hours in type? I don’t think insurers would even touch that person until they had at least five hours of dual, and rates would be pretty high until he or she crosses the 50 and then 100 hour marks.
Long, but bear with me for one more thought. TAA may be even more of a discriminator.
1. Sounds good! It wasn’t clear to me you actually did the work to do that from your first comment. Well done!
2. ATP/CPL accidents rates are lower across the board regardless of the number of engines you have. Full stop. No one is going to dispute that fact. However, even though your hypothesis maybe correct, I don’t think it carries a lot of weight if you are really trying to answer the question, “What’s safer to fly: A light twin or single engine piston?” I contend that you would have to look at the accident rates of *equally qualified pilots* in both types and run the numbers vis-a-vis apples-to-apples comparison. My article doesn’t really get into this but just points out that the twin fatality rate is noticeably higher as an observation and many ways to your point, it’s the pilot not the plane (and the ADM bits also bolster this point). Also, I sincerely doubt (I haven’t looked) there are a lot of very low time twin pilots just due to how getting into a twin plays out for most pilots. (that’s conjecture on my part I fully admit)
So, in that respect, I agree with your original point you were making regarding the inadequacies of the McSpadden report. Note: I even say so by suggesting having accident/fatality rates broken out by total time (and even better, time-in-type).
3. I get it. MOSIAC I think will solve this data quality gap (again, for better or worse).
4. Your broker said that but talk to the actual underwriter (the one signing the checks!): Type, time in type, recency, and history are the primary factors (and even determines your open pilot warranty which pro-tip: is negotiable). Age plays a role too at a certain point. With respect to Wings, I have been told that the Wings program plays a role if you get into an accident or a phone number to copy, not before. Then Wings participation is looked upon quite favorably by both the FSDO and your insurance company (this is what I’ve been told at least).
ATPs with 0 time in type happens all the time: How much Piper Comanche time you got, right? All it means though is that the ATP is considered a transition pilot for X number of hours and then qualifies for the lower rate after hitting some threshold. It’s one of the rare instances where “a $300 hamburger run” may in fact have a very high ROI.
Light twin that can’t sustain level flt single eng (at loading for that flt/terrain) just means you’ve doubled your likelihood of an engine induced “off airport landing”
A statistician may have issue with 2x likelihood, but probably close enough for horseshoes and hand-grenades…
I would be interested in hearing your speculation about why single engine retractable gear operations have nearly twice the fatality rate as single engine fixed gear planes.
What a fantastic question! Laurie, I really struggled with this one and thought about it a lot while researching for this article. If you go to the NTSB site and download the dockets for all the fatal GA accidents (P91) of 2023 and peruse cases that involved a retract you realize the fact that the plane was a retract seemed to play little to no role in the cause of the accident itself, e.g. icing encounters, LOC-i, CFIT, engine failure, VFR into IMC (Lancair 320 flown by a ~25k hour pilot), McSpadden’s impossible turn, i.e., it just happened to be a retract but the accident’s cause was far more pedestrian.
But what about light twins you say? Looking at the types of flights and what actually happened (and what can happen in a twin when problems arise), I think having that second engine played far more of a role in the accident (including for example even what kind of flight a pilot might take with a twin) than the ones that had a retractable gear. But I am all ears if you have a different take. Again, great observation.
Perhaps because they fly faster is my guess. Couple that with forgetting to extend the landing gear and or get the propeller and or manifold pressure set correctly on landing is my guess. I once forgot to extend the gear in the 182RG. Until the alarm went off. My bad. But I caught it in time. Others are or were not so fortunate.
If you remember the bombers in England during WWII, they saw the damage not the planes that came back, not the ones that crashed. Here the situation is the reverse….for example, we don’t know how many twins didn’t have accidents because they had two engines. How many singles survived because of recent advances in technology.
Can’t prove a negative though, right? At least that’s how I read your point to a certain extent.